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Abstract
Do the mass media deliver what contemporary democracies require? This
fundamental research question has been discussed for many decades and
the body of literature is firmly rooted in the debate following from the
Hutchins Commission 1947. In more recent years, monitoring of the rela-
tions between democracy and the mass media has concentrated on new or
democracies in transition. Fewer monitoring efforts have been undertaken
in mature democracies. The following text develops a social science based
monitoring instrument for established democracies, the Media for Democ-
racy Monitor (MDM). It has been developed at the University of Zurich
and tested in five European countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Lithua-
nia, Portugal, and Switzerland).
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Introduction
Modern democracy and the mass media are intrinsically related. In mod-
ern democracies the mass media are the link between those who govern
and those who are governed. Mass media need democracy because it is
the only form of government that respects freedom of speech, expression,
and information, and the independence of the media from the govern-
ment (Strömbäck, 2005: 332). Political ideas and initiatives, in turn, are
disseminated among citizens by the mass media and individual opinion
formation and voting are largely based on political information provided
by mass media.
From a normative perspective, the media have three specific democ-
ratic functions to carry out: (1) safeguarding the flow of information;
(2) providing a forum for public discussion about diverse, often conflict-
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ing political ideas; and (3) acting as a public watchdog against the abuse
of power (Strömbäck, 2005: 332).
Fulfilling these functions is not only of particular importance in so-
called new or restored democracies where media systems suffered from
oppression, corruption, or the effects of war and underdevelopment.
These functions are also of paramount importance in so-called estab-
lished or mature democracies. While the former group of countries has
been subjected to various efforts to monitor the performance of the me-
dia, the latter has partially slipped out of view.
It often goes unquestioned that the media in mature democracies fulfill
their role for democracy in the best possible way. However, there are
some doubts: It can be argued that in such states the mass media’s actual
contribution to democracy barely meets the normative demands de-
scribed above. This might be due to the interrelated processes of growing
media commercialization and mediatization of politics. Market-driven
reforms have indeed stimulated commercialization and fierce media
competition. Political actors and organizations, which depend on the
media to communicate with the electorate, have, in turn, been forced to
adapt to the new media logic.
In any democratic system it is thus important to analyze if and how
media actually serve the needs of democracy  as well as if and how
the media fail to meet their democratic functions. In this regard, media
monitoring can be of “strategic importance,” as Kaarle Nordenstreng
highlights:
“You cannot improve the media through legal and economic measures
except in marginal ways, but you can do a lot by maintaining a culture
of constant, ruthless criticism of media content and media monitoring,
which involves professionals, academics, and the general public”
(2001: 63).
There is a substantial number of media monitoring institutions. How-
ever, most of these instruments focus on democracies in transition and
do not provide much insight regarding the performance of the media in
mature democracies. We thus identify a need for a monitoring instru-
ment that measures media performance in a more sophisticated and so-
cial science based way.
This paper begins with a discussion of the theoretical considerations
and concepts regarding the relationship between media and democracy.
It draws from the main schools of thought on modern democracy, ex-
plaining what services they require from the media and what criteria
they establish for the measurement of media performance. In the follow-
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ing section a newly developed instrument for media monitoring is pre-
sented  the Media for Democracy Monitor (MDM). The MDM has
been applied in five selected European democracies in a pilot study.
Theoretical considerations
In order to understand the relationship between media and democracy,
we first must ask: What does democracy theoretically require from me-
dia? Consequently, in order to obtain the relevant criteria for the evalu-
ation of media performance it is essential to distinguish between different
concepts of democracy, for these concepts determine the requirements:
“At a time when most people rely on media for information, and when
political actors have to adapt to media logic it is reasonable to expect
that they [democratic concepts] also pose different normative obligations
upon media” (Strömbäck, 2005: 333). However, democracy is not one-
dimensional. In principle, there are as many concepts of democracy as
there are democratic countries. Several views about what characterizes
democracy give way to a multitude of concepts of democracy. Selections
from recent overviews of democratic theory (Strömbäck, 2005; Held,
2006) draw a difference between several basic concepts of democracy
that can be classified on a continuum from minimal to maximal variants:
‘Elitist democracy’ is based on a minimalist conception; ‘participatory
democracy’ is based on a mid-range concept; and ‘deliberative democ-
racy’ is based on a broader understanding of democracy1.
Concepts of democracy
From the extensive body of literature on the various models of democ-
racy we chose three prototypes: the elite or minimalist concept of democ-
racy; the participatory concept; and the deliberative concept of democ-
racy. This choice represents contemporary scholarly theories of democ-
racy.
The minimalist perspective assumes that every political system is ruled
by political elites capable of making public decisions and protecting indi-
vidual liberty. The broader public has neither adequate ability to nor
interest in governing itself. Citizens nevertheless represent the final step
that elects the representatives that will govern for a predefined period of
time. This view thus assumes active political elites on the one hand and
reacting citizens on the other. The concept is based on ideas of classical
republicanism (Held, 2006: 3255), the classical liberal model of democ-
racy (Fenske et al., 1994), and its more recent developments in the form
of the elite (Held, 2006: 125157) or pluralist models of democracy
(Schmidt, 2000: 226239)2. According to elite democracy, the basic
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requirement of the media is to provide citizens with reliable information.
In order to choose between competing political elites, people need infor-
mation and knowledge about political issues and actors.
Participatory democracy understands democracy as a value-laden sys-
tem where a strong ethos of citizen involvement, political equality, and
tolerance play crucial roles. Democracy is sustained by dedicated citi-
zens: “The more people are politically interested, the more they engage
in associations and civic organizations, the more they vote, the more
they develop attitudes and norms of generalized reciprocity, the better”
(Strömbäck, 2005: 336). Therefore, democracy can never be built or sus-
tained by elected skilled elites; it must be built and sustained by the
actions of a large number of people. Citizens act directly as a collective
and aim for the common good. This concept of democracy can be traced
back to classical Athenian democracy (Held, 2006: 1128), to the devel-
opmental form of classical republicanism (Held, 2006: 4355) and it
implies ideas of direct democracy (Held, 2006: 96122; Schmidt, 2000:
165174)3. The participatory view stipulates that media let citizens set
the agenda for their news coverage. Moreover, media should frame poli-
tics as open for everyone in order to mobilize people’s interest, engage-
ment, and participation in public life.
The third concept of democracy discussed here, deliberative democ-
racy, can be understood as an extension of participatory democracy. The
core idea of the deliberative concept of democracy is “[t]hat the notion
includes collective decision-making with the participation of all who will
be affected by the decision or their representatives: this is the democratic
part. Also, all agree that it includes decision-making by means of argu-
ments offered by and to participants who are committed to the values
of rationality and impartiality: this is the deliberative part” (Elster, 1998:
8). Citizens need opportunities to deal more profoundly with political
issues in deliberative ways. Ideally, deliberative discussions should be a
part of daily life and decision-making on all levels in society. Over the
past few years, the discussion on deliberative democracy has attracted
increased interest (Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Ha-
bermas, 1992). Like participatory democracy, deliberative democracy
calls on the media to mobilize people to participate in the political pro-
cess. What this concept adds is an emphasis on political discussions and
the importance of their deliberative nature. The active participation of
the media is therefore an essential element. In other words: Media should
provide factual information, as well as actively foster political discus-
sions as “fair-minded participants” (Merritt, 1998).
None of these non-exclusive contemporary democracy concepts are
entirely unambiguous and, in reality, democratic states may exhibit el-
ements from each of these concepts to varying degrees. This includes the
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implications for media regarding the different normative expectations on
politicians and citizens briefly referred to above. Scholarly works on
political theory, however, tend to concentrate on democracy without fo-
cusing on the media (Schudson, 1996: 205). The importance of the media
as democratic institutions and their contributions to democracy are often
taken for granted and therefore have remained more or less unexplored
(Voltmer, 1999: 14).
Democracy theories in media and communication research
While the big questions of democratic theory rarely lead researchers to the
media, some media and communication scholars, by contrast, are con-
sidering the central importance of the media for democracy. They see me-
dia freedom as well as the accountability of the media as indispensable el-
ements of a democratic societal order. Media therefore must remain sepa-
rate from the government and other powers of society, such as vested eco-
nomic interests, and should be held accountable to society as a whole.
The initial theoretical work on this topic is a study published more
than fifty years ago (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956). This study
was a by-product of the American Commission on Freedom of the Press
(Hutchins Commission, 1947) and became a baseline for describing how
different media systems operate around the world. The text proposes
that media tend to be a reflection of the society in which they are located
and therefore provide access to various points of view. Its ideas belong
to the core of libertarian theory and suit the model of a responsible free
press in a modern democracy, labeled the “social responsibility” model.
Freedom of the press is related to the view of a free marketplace of ideas
and of self-imposed responsibility. However, the scholarly weight of the
text and its ideological basis were widely criticized not least because of
its oversimplified framing of history, its analytical inadequacy, and its
U.S.-based research (e. g., Nerone, 1995; McQuail, 1994; Hallin and
Mancini, 2004).
More recently, various authors have found alternative routes to take
other realities and other models of the functioning of the media in a
democratic society into account. Picard (1985) defines a democratic
framework for understanding the changing nature of media economics
and government-press relations in terms of Western models, termed the
“democratic socialist” model. The text offers proposals for achieving
both a democratically functioning press (even through collective owner-
ship) to assure independence from special interests and broader public
intervention to provide access and diversity of opinion. “Under the de-
mocratic socialist view, media can be truly democratic only if they are
removed from the private sector, spared the effects of economic competi-
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tion, freed from undue restraints and pressures  whatever the source 
and induced to provide the capacity for citizens to communicate effec-
tively with other citizens” (Picard, 1985: 35).
Raboy and Bruck (1989) distinguish between three conceptions of de-
mocracy by looking at that which they struggle against. “Liberal democ-
racy” fights against censorship and all forms of prohibition; “social de-
mocracy” opposes economic domination; and “cultural or communica-
tion democracy” fights against “spectacularization” (which today we
might label as “scandalization”).
According to Schudson (2003), three models determine how media are
governed: the “market,” the “trustee,” and the “advocacy” model. The
market-based model follows the laws of the marketplace and does not
specifically posit any normative links to media. The trustee model im-
plies that media protect the citizen’s interests, for example, by focusing
on regulators or legal requirements. The advocacy model calls for the
media to serve the public by arguing a consistent and coherent point of
view, with the aim of newsgathering being to advance a political or social
movement. Another classification has been provided by Hallin and Man-
cini (2004) suggesting three analytical-descriptive concepts of modern
democracies: the “North/Central European or democratic corporatist”
(citizen interest and media independence is guaranteed by government
intervention); the “Mediterranean or polarized pluralist” (the structure
of political ideology in a society determines media partisanship); and the
“North Atlantic or liberal” (market-based) model. This framework
serves first of all the comparative study of Western media systems, as
understood within their political and historical contexts.
McQuail (2005) offers a normative model encompassing four proto-
types: the “market,” the “public interest,” the “professional,” and the
“alternative media” models.
C. Edwin Baker (2006) distinguishes four different concepts of democ-
racy in terms of the requirements for the media. For elite democracy, the
greatest importance of the media lies in providing information and in its
activity during elections. Between elections, media should serve as the
watchdogs over the state and the current administration. Republican
democracies focus on the public good, with the media required to objec-
tively take all relevant events and societal developments into account.
Liberal-pluralist democracies are based on the representation of different
voices in society and media play an important role in making them
heard. Finally, complex democracies are built on processes of delibera-
tion. Media should encourage and empower different groups in society
to express themselves and advocate for their causes. Baker’s work refers
to many other earlier works in the realm of democracy and media, such
as Webster (1999), Curran (2000), and Dahlgren (2001).
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Kaarle Nordenstreng (2006) describes four different concepts of de-
mocracy. Pluralist democracies concentrate on individual freedom, con-
sider market forces as engines of welfare, and allow media a maximum
amount of freedom. Administrative democracies rely on expert bodies
that should inform the public about their actions and practices, with the
media being instruments to this end. Deliberative democracies rely on
the self-consciousness of citizens and require the media to assist citizens
in becoming involved in issues of public interest. As a fourth model,
Nordenstreng adds direct democracy, where media should provide chan-
nels for all voices in society.
The brief review of the literature above illustrates the need to clarify
the understanding of the relationship between democracy and media.
Media studies have produced various normative theories and innumer-
able models concerning media and democracy. However, there is no sys-
tematic school of thought: While the texts provide us with inferences or
indications, they have very few elaborate explanations nor do they pro-
vide much empirical evidence. Empirical work is accomplished rather by
a number of pragmatic media monitoring institutions. These institutions
are united in their belief that media are essential elements for the devel-
opment of democracy. They use different instruments and methodologies
to measure mass media’s contribution to the functioning of democracy.
Their monitoring instruments, however, share weaknesses in their theo-
retical foundations (Becker, Vlad and Nusser, 2007). It is therefore our
intention to develop an instrument rooted in social science that monitors
the performance of the media for contemporary democracies.
The Media for Democracy Monitor (MDM)
The opportunity to develop an instrument to address our research ques-
tions was presented to the project team by a major research program
based at the University of Zurich within the multi-annual Swiss National
Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) program called “Democracy
in the 21st Century.”
Our starting point is to investigate the ability of the media to enable,
foster, or even hinder the development of contemporary democracies.
We assume that legal frameworks are in line with democratic require-
ments and that the mass media enjoy freedom from censorship and un-
due government intervention. This basic assumption does, however, limit
the range and number of countries that can be analyzed with our instru-
ment. Nevertheless, this limiting assumption still enables us to take a
much more detailed and critical look at mass media organizations. Our
research question is not whether the government allows for media free-
dom: Rather, we investigate whether the mass media make the best use
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of their freedoms and to what degree they contribute to democratic life.
Our object of research is therefore not the state and its legal and admin-
istrative frameworks, but the mass media organizations themselves.
Root concept of democracy
Drawing from the wide range of concepts of democracy outlined above,
we argue that democracy is always based on three fundamental prin-
ciples: freedom, equality, and control. These principles originate from
the ‘Age of Enlightenment’ and the great democratic revolutions of the
18th and 19th Centuries. They are the principles that proponents of de-
mocracy from all eras and places have struggled for and which have
accompanied the development of modern states (Schulz, 2000: 1). The
principles are broad and robust and warrant more detailed discussion:
Freedom can be understood as consisting of three types of rights: polit-
ical, civil, and social (or socioeconomic). Freedom rights are based on
the idea of people’s freedom to act (e. g., freedom of opinion, freedom
of association, freedom of information). In their widest sense, freedom
rights should thus be viewed as protecting people’s ability to act indepen-
dently and with self-determination in political, economic, social, and cul-
tural terms. Of central importance for people’s freedom is the protection
against infringements by the state. “Over time, the list of negative free-
dom rights has grown and the protection and guarantee of these rights
have become one of the minimal conditions for democratic regimes.”
(Bühlmann, Merkel, and Wessels, 2007: 8). Beyond this protection, con-
ditions must be created to ensure that people are able to develop freely
and lead a self-determined life. From this perspective, political liberties
are seen as preconditions for citizens to actively influence political deci-
sions. This implies that the government must protect freedom rights
(Lauth, 2004: 77).
Equality, understood as political equality, proclaims the equality of all
citizens in and before the law and in the political process. Equality thus
means equal treatment of all citizens by the state and equal rights to
participate in politics  i. e., all citizens’ preferences have the same
weight in political decisions (Dahl, 2006: 4). According to Bühlmann,
Merkel, and Wessels (2007: 7), the meaning of equality can be shown by
two important struggles: “On the one hand, the emergence of modern
democracies goes hand in hand with the growing demand for equal treat-
ment of all citizens by the government. The constitutional guarantee of
equality before the law and of the protection of individual rights is the
outcome of this development. On the other hand, the importance of
political equality is illustrated by the development of universal suffrage:
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the struggle for equal rights to participate for all people went along with
the development of democratic states in the last century.”
Control is essential for democracy and its political institutions. This
principle demands that citizens control their representatives in the gov-
ernment in order to secure their own freedom and equality: “[I]n a good
democracy the citizens themselves have the sovereign power to evaluate
whether the government provides liberty and equality according to the
rule of law” (Diamond and Morlino, 2004: 4). This also implies that
citizens, their organizations, and parties participate and compete to hold
elected officials accountable for their policies and actions. Moreover,
they monitor the efficiency and fairness of the application of the laws as
well as the efficacy of government decisions. Governmental institutions
also hold one another accountable before the law and the constitution:
“The control of the executive over policies […] must be subject to democ-
ratic control and institutional checks and balances” (Bühlmann, Merkel,
and Wessels, 2007: 8).
In sum, we define freedom, equality, and control as the three funda-
mental principles indispensable to classifying a political system as demo-
cratic. These principles are not only normatively but also functionally
and structurally linked to each other. Therefore, a “quality democracy”
is considered “to be one that provides its citizens a high degree of free-
dom, political equality, and popular control over public policies and
policy-makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable
institutions” (Diamond and Morlino, 2004: 3).
Democratic media functions
In order to evaluate the democratic performance of the mass media we
must clarify how the three principles of the root concept relate to com-
munication processes. Various authors have convincingly demonstrated
the close connection between the principles and specific functions mass
media must perform in modern democracies (e. g., Lauth, 2004; Voltmer,
1999, 2000; Schulz, 2000; Norris, 2000; McQuail, 1992, 1999):
Freedom as a principle in civil society has often been defined in terms
of communication rights to hold opinions and to receive and convey
information: “Political communication in democracy is connected with
the idea of freedom. Freedom of expression and opinion-building as in-
dividual basic rights and as institutional guarantees for an independent
media system are part of the very core of democracy; they are an element
of a democratic order per se” (Sarcinelli, 1995: 241; translation by the
authors). In this view, freedom of expression is both a crucial individual
right and an indispensable social good. Freedom, according to McQuail
(1992: 67) and Schulz (2000: 3), also entails the economic freedom of the
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media to operate in their public role and in their private business ca-
pacity.
The media’s communication function, which derives from freedom, is
the information function. Media can perform this function due to their
specific capabilities to collect and process large amounts of information
as well as to distribute it to all participants of the political process
(Voltmer, 1999: 13).
Equality as a principle must be translated into more specific terms if
it is to be applied to the mass media: “[Equality], too, is connected with
public communication in less direct, but no less crucial ways” (McQuail,
1992: 67). In relation to communication and political power, it is equality
that demands that no special favor be given to power-holders and that
access to media should be provided on a fair basis to oppositional or
divergent opinions, perspectives, or claims. Equality calls for an absence
of discrimination or bias in the amount and kind of access available
to channels, on equivalent terms, for all alternative voices, as far as is
practicable. Or as McQuail (1992: 67) wrote: “If we suppose there to be
a ‘right to communicate,’ then we also suppose an equal claim for all to
hear and be heard.”
The media’s communication function that follows from equality is
what might be called public opinion-making or simply the forum func-
tion. Mass media as a forum are expected to represent the full range of
political standpoints and to give access to all political actors who aim at
addressing the public (Voltmer, 2000: 3).
Control, as a principle in relation to communication and power, as-
sumes that the mass media should act on behalf of the public as a watch-
dog holding government officials accountable (Norris, 2000: 28). In or-
der to preserve the conditions for the enjoyment of civil rights and politi-
cal liberties, the mass media should act as an independent, fair, and
impartial critic of powerful interests. It should also report on abuses of
political and economic power. This implies that mass media should not
just be informing in an unfiltered way and without critical analysis of
political messages. Some liberal authors consider the watchdog function
as even more important than the information function. Kelly and Don-
way (1990: 70) argue: “We have distinguished two political roles of free
press in classical liberalism: the watchdog and the democratic [i. e., infor-
mation] functions. And we noted that for advocates of limited govern-
ment, the first is by far the more important [...]. The implication of this
priority is that even if, contrary to all the evidence we have cited, the
government could use its power effectively to strengthen the democratic
[i. e., information] function, it would not be justified in doing so at the
cost of the watchdog function” (quoted from Voltmer, 1999: 30).
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The media’s communication function, which follows from control, is
to act as a watchdog against the abuse of all types of power.
To sum up, the functions the media and communication processes
must perform in order to promote the three fundamental democratic
principles are to serve as (1) a guardian of the flow of information; (2)
a public forum for public discussion of diverse, often conflicting political
ideas; and as (3) a public watchdog against the abuse of power in its
various forms. Although these functions have been identified separately,
they are nevertheless interconnected and overlapping. Based on these
three media functions, we will now identify more specific features of the
media and their environment that enable them to carry out these func-
tions. This is done in order to better assess the media’s performance in
contemporary democracy.
Dimensions and criteria of the Media for Democracy Monitor (MDM)
In order to monitor and evaluate the media’s performance in a given
society, the democratic principles and corresponding media functions
must be translated into more specific democratic features (and variables).
These features can be divided into performance criteria and structural
conditions. Performance criteria correspond to the actual behavior of
media organizations, how they interpret their mission, and how they
act in their markets with regard to democratic requirements. Structural
conditions are external to media organizations. They are set either by
government regulation or through self-organizational instruments by the
media sector as a whole. Structural conditions are typically not influ-
enced by individual behavior, while performance criteria are entirely un-
der the control of media organizations.
The relevant features can be identified for different levels of analysis:
the macro, meso, and micro levels. The macro level focuses on legal and
administrative rules and regulations (such as constitutional guarantees,
absence of censorship, etc.), the state of available infrastructures, and
the degree of media concentration in relevant markets. The meso level
refers to the internal organization of the mass media, their ownership
and financing, and the degree of independence from the government and
other interests. The micro level takes the output of the mass media, their
diversity of genres, and their thematic focal points into consideration.
Media consumption refers to modalities of reception of mass media as
well as to the changes of reception patterns between media genres (in-
cluding online media).
Freedom, as the principle which demands that mass media carry out
information functions, refers to conditions rather than performance cri-
teria (McQuail, 1992: 69). Accordingly, the legal system under which the
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media operate must guarantee individual communication freedom, i. e.,
the freedom of access to information, the freedom of expression, and the
freedom of distribution of opinion (Lauth, 2004: 334). Freedom requires
media access to different sources of information. In addition, journalists
are the main beneficiaries of specific legal rights “such as a special right
of information vis-a`-vis state authorities, a right to refuse to give evi-
dence in trials (in order to protect informants), as well as a protection
of editorial offices against confiscation by public prosecutors” (Schulz,
2000: 4). Freedom calls not only for the absence of a legally imposed
licensing or censorship mechanism, but also for the granting of a degree
of independence from political and economic pressures and autonomy
for journalists within media organizations. According to Schulz (2000:
4), “[…] media must neither be owned by the state, nor by political
parties or by banks and business groups. And these organizations must
not have influence through property shared or governing bodies on the
contents or the personnel policy of mass media.” Although public service
broadcasting models show that government intervention need not be
inconsistent with communication freedom, it is essential in cases of state
monopolies to carefully examine which objectives are actually pursued
and if diversity of the media landscape is guaranteed (Lauth, 2004: 179).
From equality, several performance criteria can be deduced that must
be met by the media in order to serve as a public forum and to promote
opinion-making. Equality demands a “[…] fair access to channels, on
equivalent terms, for all alternative voices that meet relevant criteria”
(McQuail, 1992: 71). From this ‘communication equality,’ the criterion
of media diversity can be deduced. Media systems characterized by a
high degree of diversity fulfill the function of a public forum where the
exchange of arguments and collective deliberation takes place. According
to Voltmer (2000: 9), diversity implies partially independent two aspects:
diversity of media actors (the quantitative dimension) and diversity of
opinions (the content dimension).
Diversity of actors refers to the number of media actors that partici-
pate in the political communication process. While quantity is certainly
a necessary condition, it does not suffice for media diversity: “A high
number of the ‘same’ would not allow meaningful choices on the part of
the citizens. The emphasis is therefore on significant differences between
the media [...]” (Voltmer, 2000: 9). In this regard, ownership structure is
usually regarded as the most crucial element. Ownership concentration
limits competition between media actors and thus reduces diversity. Ac-
cording to Voltmer (2000: 9), “the increasing internationalization of me-
dia companies is a severe impediment of transparency and political con-
trol of ownership structures.” Accordingly, the main goal of formal me-
dia regulation is to preserve media diversity by guaranteeing a number
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of media outlets with different ownership. Moreover, diversity is en-
hanced by different forms of media financing and control: “A system
that comprises both forms of formal arrangement provides more pos-
sibilities of choice than a monostructural system. Diversity is even higher
when each of the structural alternatives consists of more than one actor”
(Voltmer, 2000: 10).
Diversity of content refers to the political viewpoints represented and
supported by the media: “In the context of democratic opinion building
the diversity of opinions is the ultimate dimension of the diversity con-
cept” (Voltmer, 2000: 10). As a structural attribute, content diversity
refers to the media’s general policy of information processing rather than
the actual reporting (McQuail, 1992: 170 ff.). The range and the variety
of opinions indicate the plurality of political alternatives represented in
the system. The balance of opinion means that all relevant social groups
and political actors  and therefore opposing viewpoints  must have
access to mass media (Schulz, 2000: 2). Two different structural prin-
ciples are discussed in the literature as the basic patterns of content di-
versity: Internal content diversity can be guaranteed by any individual
medium if it reflects the entire spectrum of existing political viewpoints.
External content diversity is guaranteed by a plurality of media actors,
each of them representing a particular political perspective. Although
the latter model accepts that contents provided by individual media are
imbalanced, it can be assumed that as long as there is a balance of
politically aligned media actors at the aggregate level, media diversity is
guaranteed (Voltmer, 2000: 10).
Equality as an evaluative principle also implies the criterion of media
objectivity. This criterion also has other sources of support, such as the
criterion of media independence (identified as a benefit of freedom). Ac-
cording to McQuail (1992: 73), the link with equality is strong as far as
“objectivity requires a fair and non-discriminatory attitude to sources
and to objects of news reporting  all should be treated on equal terms.”
Westerstahl (1983) demonstrates that objectivity is primarily a form of
media practice and it expresses a particular attitude toward the task
of information collection, processing, and dissemination (organizational
goals and professional norms). Objectivity calls for compliance with
truthfulness criteria like accuracy or relevance and it also covers aspects
of balance (or non-partisanship) and neutral presentation.
Control, which calls for the media to play a watchdog role, interfaces
and overlaps to a great extent with the benefits described under the
headings ‘freedom’ and ‘equality.’ For example, the criterion of media
independence is also a condition for exercising a watchdog function, i. e.,
through criticism and control of political and economic power. At the
same time, diversity of media actors is essential insofar as vertical and
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diagonal concentration reduces mutual journalistic control (Schulz,
2000: 4). The central criterion that media must meet in order to carry out
their watchdog role, however, is criticism. The most important structural
condition required for the media in this context is the availability of
sufficient resources to exercise the watchdog role: “The more money is
at the disposal of a newspaper or radio station, the more news agencies
can be subscribed to, the more reporters can be employed, the more
money can be invested into forms of investigative journalism” (Schulz,
2000: 3). According to Norris (2000: 34), the most effective way to ex-
plore the extent to which the media provide effective scrutiny of govern-
ment and big business is “[...] with historical case studies describing the
role of the media in classic examples of the abuse of power, public scan-
dals and government corruption [...].”
To sum up: The performance criteria and structural conditions dis-
cussed above reflect a summary of mainstream and widely found features
underlying most media systems in contemporary democracies. There is
an intrinsic connection and occasional tension between the features iden-
tified. To cite only a few examples: The main concepts of access and
diversity appear under the headings of both ‘freedom’ and ‘equality.’
Objectivity, which is connected with the principle of ‘equality,’ has links
with the principle of ‘freedom,’ as independence is a necessary condition
for impartiality and truthfulness. Under certain extreme conditions (e. g.,
political repression, crisis, war, etc.), by contrast, the freedom to report
can only be exercised in return for a guarantee of objectivity (McQuail,
1992: 73). Despite such overlapping, the main features discussed can be
expressed as a set of several variables constituting our analytical frame-
work. The variables refer, on the one hand, to structural conditions and,
on the other, to performance criteria that the media must fulfill. Based
on these findings, we can identify measurable indicators for thoroughly
monitoring the mass media.
For the purpose of developing a monitoring instrument, we went one
step further and deduced a number of indicators from these general prin-
ciples. In order to keep the instrument workable, we decided to concen-
trate on the meso level, while including only a few micro aspects to the
instrument. We justify the elimination of the macro level by the limited
applicability of the instrument to mature democracies. Within these po-
litical settings, it can be assumed that basic communication rights are
given and undisputed. The content level, at the other end of the
spectrum, has been eliminated because of research economics and meth-
odological difficulties. Content analysis would of course substantially
add to the MDM and would provide additional insights; however, re-
search capacity often allows only for a limited instrument and content
analysis can easily be added as a complement when resources become
available.
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Table 1. Democracy root concept for the Media for Democracy Monitor (MDM).
Table 1 illustrates our theory concept and contains 19 indicators that
have been developed to provide a number of measurable areas for each
democracy principle. Each indicator is defined and how each of these
indicator criteria applies in the countries under review is also illustrated.
Indicators
For each dimension we defined relevant indicators to illustrate the per-
formance of the media with regard to the respective democracy function.
Each indicator should refer to the dimensions of freedom, equality, and
control; data should be available to measure the degree to which the
requirements are met. The following indicators have been developed:
Freedom: ‘Diversity of media supply/Media availability’
This structural feature refers to the specific country and its media land-
scape. According to this feature, freedom is better guaranteed if the rel-
evant news media are available to all citizens and widely used by them.
The following two indicators deal with the distribution and consumption
of news:
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Indicator F1: Geographic distribution of news media availability
Are the relevant news media available to all citizens? Is there a re-
gional divide?
This indicator relates to the geographic distribution of news media. It
seeks a media landscape which is characterized by high levels of public
access, including for marginalized groups, and by the possibility of
efficient use of technology to gather and distribute news and informa-
tion. News media should therefore be widely available and regional
divides should not exist. This implies a high degree of technical reach
and unrestricted access to news media so that a full supply of all types
of news media can be guaranteed. Geographic distribution as an indi-
cator of freedom should not be undervalued. It has always been a key
principle of media structure, closely connected with social structure:
“Differences of geography may also coincide with ethnic, religious or
language differences within the national society” (McQuail, 1992: 115).
Indicator F2: Patterns of news media use (consumption of news)
What is the distribution of media use between newspapers, television
news, radio news, and online media? What is the reach of the main
news broadcasts?
This indicator relates to the reach of the primarily used news media.
It focuses on the daily usage share of newspapers, television, radio,
and online media. Such a survey shows which news media reach the
largest group of citizens and which media therefore have a potentially
greater influence on public opinion.
Freedom: Editorial and journalistic autonomy
This performance feature refers to the selected news media and focuses
on the status of editorial and journalistic autonomy within media organi-
zations. It calls for the granting of a degree of independence from in-
ternal and external influences and pressures.
Indicator F3: Internal rules for newsroom democracy
Is there a formal procedure for involving journalists in decisions on
personnel, editor-in-chief, etc.?
This indicator relates to the idea of newsroom democracy and to con-
ditions of freedom for the editorial staff. It looks for organizational
structures that guarantee the independence of the individual member
of the editorial staff and thus the promotion of responsible and re-
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sponsive journalism (objective reporting). There can be different ways
to ensure the internal freedom of the press and to involve journalists
in the management of information and in important decisions at the
heart of a media organization (existence of newsroom council, internal
rules of electing/appointing the editor-in-chief, etc.). The indicator
seeks to ascertain if any formal procedures (or strict rules) have been
established to ensure journalists’ participation in decision-making
(e. g., via a newsroom council or through regular procedures for nomi-
nating the editor-in-chief).
Indicator F4: Company rules against internal influence on newsroom/
editorial staff
What is the degree of independence of the newsroom vis-a`-vis the
ownership/management? Are there rules on the separation of the
newsroom from the ownership/management? Are they implemented?
This indicator relates to the degree of interference by the management
and other internal controllers on editorial decisions. It assumes that
democratic freedom is greater when more journalists can decide inde-
pendently on editorial matters. The question does not of course arise
in the same way when government has legitimate control over the
media (as in most European public broadcasting systems) and sets
legal limits to freedom (McQuail, 1992: 117). To safeguard the inde-
pendence of newsrooms and journalists against the management or
sales department, however, some internal rules are useful. An impor-
tant rule, for instance, is that the newsroom and the management
must be clearly separated. This prevents internal manipulation and
influence as well as avoids involving the newsroom in advertising rela-
tionships.
Indicator F5: Company rules against external influence on newsroom/
editorial staff
What is the degree of interference by external parties (e. g., propri-
etors, advertisers, etc.)? Do news media receive revenue from a
multitude of sources?
This indicator relates to the degree of interference by external parties
on editorial decisions. These are influences that derive from pressures
in the operating environment of the media, particularly from advertis-
ers, news sources, and organized pressure groups or public relations
bodies. In practice, media often rely on several different simultaneous
sources of income  a condition that conventional wisdom holds to
be better for freedom. Particularly in the case of the newspaper, we
can say that the more financial resources originating from a third
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party (e. g., government, a single large advertiser or sponsor), the less
plausible is the claim of full independence (McQuail, 1992: 106).
Equality: Quantitative diversity
This structural feature refers to the specific country and its media system.
According to this feature, equality is better guaranteed if there are large
numbers of different media outlets (quantitative external diversity).
Ownership structure is accordingly regarded as the most crucial element.
It is also equally important that the news should be able to reach the
citizen by means of different formats. Finally, there is a greater chance
of achieving equality if mass media are employed by minority groups
(alternative media, third sector).
Indicator E1: Media ownership concentration at the regional level
What is the degree of ownership concentration at the regional level?
This indicator measures the degree of ownership concentration in the
market of regional news media. In this context, each country must
first define its major communication areas and then show the regional
selection of newspapers, broadcasters, and online media. Ideally, more
than two competing news media outlets are available in each news
media sector. With a lower concentration, a larger number of ‘players’
has access to the market and the likelihood of the emergence of more
diverse opinions is greater.
Indicator E2: Media ownership concentration at the national level
What is the degree of ownership concentration at the national level?
This indicator refers to the degree of ownership concentration at the
national level. The central assumption is that concentration in the me-
dia may compromise the plurality of the media landscape. A national
market controlled by one operator (monopoly) or by two (oligopoly)
can be problematic in this regard. Ideally, more than two competing
news media outlets should therefore be available in each news media
sector.
Indicator E3: Diagonal ownership concentration
What is the degree of diagonal ownership concentration? Are relevant
news media partly or fully owned by non-media companies?
This indicator refers to the degree of diagonal (or cross-media) owner-
ship concentration. Diagonal concentration refers not only to one me-
dia market (like E1 and E2) and can be understood in two ways: First,
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it can be simple cross-ownership, such as when a newspaper owner
holds a share in a television or radio station. It can also apply when
a non-media company (e. g., from the pharmaceutical, steel, real es-
tate, or private equity sector) acquires a stake in a mass medium.
Indicator E4: Diversity of formats
Is there diversity in news presentation formats?
This indicator measures the diversity of the respective formats and
news presentations. It indicates plurality of information through
multiple types of newspapers, broadcasters, and online media as well
as their use to provide news to the public. Accordingly, it can be said
that when more options and greater variety of news formats exist,
there is thus more diversity that is then provided to the consumer.
It is not plausible to assume that ownership diversity alone would
automatically translate into news format diversity (see ownership con-
centration E13).
Indicator E5: Minority/Alternative media
Do minority/alternative media exist? Are all types of minorities served
by media? Do they have their own media? Minorities include ethnic
groups, those with disabilities, women, minority linguistic groups, etc.
This indicator refers to the existence of minority/alternative media.
It is uncontested that media can contribute to diversity by reflecting
differences in society: “Media are expected to represent the prevailing
differences of culture, opinion and social conditions of the population
as a whole” (McQuail, 1992: 144). Ideally, all major minorities of a
country are served by a variety of special minority/alternative media
or are well-represented by other media based on rules or conventions.
Equality: Access diversity
This structural feature refers to the specific country and its media system.
According to this feature, equality is better guaranteed if there is a plu-
rality of affordable public and private news media and thus more choices
for citizens.
Indicator E6: Affordable public and private news media
What is the relative price of the mass media in relation to average
household income?
According to this indicator, media should be available at a reasonable
price. In order to provide people with equal opportunities to inform
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themselves on a regular basis, the price of the available media must
be within the means of a majority of the population. This indicator
measures the cost of access to newspapers (price of subscription), tele-
vision and radio (license fee, pay TV), and online media (broadband
connection).
Equality: Content diversity
This structural feature refers to the specific country and its mass media
landscape. According to this feature, equality is better guaranteed if
there is a large number of politically neutral outlets (internal diversity)
or a balance of politically aligned media organizations at the aggregate
level (external diversity). For this reason, it is important that there are
bodies or institutions that can monitor, for example, the actual political
neutrality of the media.
Indicator E7: Content monitoring instrument
Is there a regular and publicly available issue monitoring instrument
for news media?
This indicator illustrates if a country’s media system has a body or an
instrument to monitor news media content. Such an instrument should
be independent, publicly available, and able to operate on a regular
basis. Such content monitoring might be institutionalized by the media
themselves, by supervising bodies, by university institutes, or other
organizations. The existence of a permanent content monitoring insti-
tution by itself is considered to have a positive impact on journalists’
behavior and helps to foster the idea of media accountability.
Equality: Objectivity
Objectivity is both a performance and a structural feature. On the one
side, it refers to the selected news media and the internal regulation of its
organizations and, on the other side, it focuses on the countries’ national
regulations. According to this, the media should be able to guarantee
both objective reporting and the existence of appropriate national mea-
sures (e. g., ethics codes).
Indicator E8: Code of ethics at the national level
Does a code of ethics at the national level exist which requires news
media to provide fair, balanced, and impartial reporting? Is it known
about and adhered to?
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This indicator examines the existence of a national code of ethics and
its implementation and usage by media personnel. Moreover, it looks
for institutions involved in handling complaints on media perform-
ance, such as journalist associations, complaint commissions, and om-
budsmen.
Indicator E9: Level of self-regulation
Does a media self-regulation system exist for the main news media?
Do these systems require fair, balanced, and impartial reporting? Are
they effective?
This indicator seeks to determine the existence of an institutionalized
and effective self-regulation system for the main news media of a
country. It checks if internal tools for editorial policies (such as mis-
sion statements, codes of ethics, editorial guidelines, etc.) are imple-
mented in line with formal rules. The central assumption is that the
mass media, within a prevailing climate of self-regulation and respect
for the journalistic profession, effectively reflect and represent the di-
versity of views and interests in society.
Equality: Platform for democratic discourse
This performance feature refers to the selected news media and monitors
possibilities for people to participate in the news process. Participation
promotes the reflection and representation of a diversity of views and
interests in society.
Indicator E10: Participation
Is there an organized way for people to participate in the news pro-
cess?
This indicator examines the extent to which news media give citizens
the opportunity to voice their own views and reactions to news stories
they read or hear. Moreover, it looks at how well the media encourage
citizens to even participate in the production of news. Such an ap-
proach asks the news media to be open to forms of cooperation with
citizens. Lastly, it can be said that the larger the number of citizens
who participate, the greater the chance of having a multitude of opin-
ions. Online media are best situated to organize such a forum by pro-
viding web-space for user reactions.
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Control: Public criticism
This structural feature refers to the specific country and its media system.
It focuses on control mechanisms that exercise a watchdog role with
regard to the media itself.
Indicator C1: Supervising the watchdog / ‘control of the controllers’
Is there any institutionalized mechanism to monitor the performance
and role of the news media?
This indicator examines the existence of instruments to monitor media
performance. It is important to examine what tools the different media
have in order to adequately function as a watchdog as well as to look
at how far the media actually deal with controversial matters, engage
in public criticism, and risk antagonizing either powerful interests or
their own audience. Moreover, it is important to examine the degree
to which the media play an active role in their society or community.
Control: Journalistic accountability
This performance feature refers to the selected news media. The focus is
on mechanisms which encourage journalistic accountability and promote
democratic control of the government and big business.
Indicator C2: The watchdog and the media’s mission statement
Does the mission statement of the company or the newsroom contain
provisions on playing an active watchdog role, on investigative jour-
nalism, or on other forms of power monitoring?
This indicator examines extent to which the news media perform their
mission as watchdogs. The view of media as a watchdog against the
abuse of power and corruption has long been a staple ingredient of
the journalistic self-image and of Western democratic political theory
(McQuail, 1992: 120). This indicator intends to reveal how far the
watchdog function is perceived as important both in theory and in
practice. Furthermore, it seeks to uncover whether a mission statement
exists that refers explicitly to active investigative journalism.
Indicator C3: Professional training
How much importance is attached to journalism training?
This indicator provides information on whether journalists are given
the chance to take part in professional training courses. The news
media can only perform their watchdog duty if they have qualified
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personnel resources. In order to do so, the news media should provide
their staff with training courses in watchdog journalism.
Control: Resources
This performance feature refers to the selected news media. The basic
condition for exercising the watchdog role is that sufficient resources are
available for journalists in the newsrooms. The more money there is at
the disposal of newsrooms, the greater the number of news agencies that
can be subscribed to, the more reporters who can be employed, and the
more funds that can be invested into forms of investigative journalism,
etc. (Schulz, 2000: 3).
Indicator C4: Watchdog function and financial resources
Are there specific and sufficient resources for exercising investigative
journalism or other forms of power monitoring?
This indicator refers to the financial resources of newsrooms for per-
forming their watchdog function. To perform their mission as a watch-
dog in an appropriate way, it is crucial that they have the appropriate
means with respect to time and budgets. Limited resources have often
been cited as a potential cause of constraint on the independence of
journalism. Resources for their own investigations reduce the depen-
dency on agency material. Additionally, news media perform better if
they can make use of journalists who are specialists on given subjects.
In this way, there will be more room for investigative journalism.
Empirical research concept
The Media for Democracy Monitor is designed as a multi-annual compar-
ative instrument and is open to include established (or: advanced, ma-
ture, contemporary) democracies. The methodology of the monitoring
instrument is designed to conform to three key characteristics:
 Simple: The instrument is largely based on qualitative data collected
by experts in various countries. There is an important normative el-
ement in the instrument, and the results depend, to some extent, on
the professional perception of the country expert. Although social
science methods are applied, there remains some subjectivity in evalu-
ating the country’s media system with regard to democracy. There-
fore, the instrument cannot be based on sophisticated statistical
methods; it should rather reflect the performance of the leading news
media. The instrument is designed in this regard to be simple.
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 Comparative: The instrument must be applicable to a large variety of
countries. Although restricted to so-called advanced or mature de-
mocracies, the variety of democracy models is great. A highly sophis-
ticated monitoring instrument would necessarily take national specifi-
cities into account  at the expense of the comparative approach.
We therefore chose methods (and questions) applicable to all such
democracies without going into detail with regard to specific democ-
ratic features that might apply in one country but not in others. The
instrument is designed to be comparative.
 Transparent: From a social science perspective, the most important
requirement on such an instrument is transparency. The monitoring
instrument justifies the choice of indicators (basically with reference
to literature) as well as the “democracy points” given. National corre-
spondents deliver detailed accounts about their countries, with this
information being an integral part of the overall report. Readers may
go back to each indicator to review the information provided by the
country experts. The instrument thus delivers a high level of transpar-
ency.
Objects of investigation
Choice of countries. The 19 indicators have already been applied in 2008
in a pilot study covering a number of countries. The choice of the coun-
tries was limited by the research budget that allowed for no more than
five. The choice was also influenced by the availability of researchers
willing to volunteer for the pilot study. Despite these constraints, we
sought to select countries that are as different from each other as pos-
sible, namely, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Swit-
zerland. These countries differ in various respects:
 On the large-small continuum (e. g., Germany and Switzerland);
 On the north-south continuum (e. g., Lithuania and Portugal);
 On the east-west continuum (e. g., Netherlands and Lithuania);
 On the old-new democracy continuum (e. g., Lithuania and the others).
In each country, a small team of social scientists were chosen to deliver
a report on all indicators. A short version of these extensive country
reports is documented in the annex4.
Choice of leading news media. The indicators were extensively discussed
in a joint workshop in November 2007. In order to apply the instrument
in the selected country, each researcher made a comprehensive selection
that reflected a representative picture of the pertinent media system (me-
On media monitoring 193
dia sample). As the media landscape is becoming more diverse and as
media consumption habits are changing, the sample had to include dif-
ferent media types that can be broken down into four main sectors:
 Newspapers;
 Television news;
 Radio news;
 Online news.
The content produced by each media sector varies considerably in quan-
tity, as do audience sizes. In order to be representative, the sample has
to meet further criteria, such as the inclusion of the main elite media
(media of the “governing”) as well as the main citizen media (media of
the “governed”). The latter corresponds to the media with the highest
audience reach (amount of reach/circulation). The elite media, on the
other hand, refer to the leading quality news media.
Method
In order to apply the 19 indicators in practice, they had to be more
narrowly defined. First, we formulated a precise question for each indi-
cator. Moreover, we had to define the main requirement explaining why
the indicator is relevant for assessing whether the media promote democ-
racy. In a further step we defined appropriate criteria allowing us to
assess whether the question relating to the indicator can be answered
positively or negatively. Depending on whether these criteria are fulfilled
or not, we attributed ‘democracy points’ between 0 and 3 measuring the
extent to which the media meet the expectations set out in the indicator:
 0  Country’s news media do not meet any criteria of the indicator;
 1  Country’s news media meet some criteria of the indicator;
 2  Country’s news media meet most criteria of the indicator;
 3  Country’s news media meet all criteria of the indicator.
Finally, we decided on the data sources that provided us with the neces-
sary information for each indicator. The data for the study were gen-
erally collected in two parts. The first consists of existing statistical data
and data originated by other researchers that were collected and aggre-
gated (through desk research). The second part is original primary re-
search consisting of interviews conducted with media professionals of
the leading news media. For this purpose a non-standardized question-
naire was developed with the formulated questions referring to specific
indicators. All leading interviews were conducted personally. Table 2
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Table 2. Closer definition of indicators F3, E1, and C2 (examples).
(F3) Internal rules for newsroom democracy
Question Is there a formal procedure on how to involve journalists in
decisions on personnel, editor-in-chief, etc.?
Requirement If effective rules in this regard exist, it is more likely that
democratic freedom is guaranteed and thus that democracy is
promoted.
Points 3 Full democratic control by journalists in the newsrooms
0 Decisions in the newsroom do not involve journalists at all
Criteria  Existence of a newsroom council
 Internal rules for electing/appointing editor-in-chief, other
positions, etc.
 Journalists choose their editor-in-chief
 …
Data Sources Interviews
(E1) Media ownership concentration at the regional level
Question What is the degree of ownership concentration at the regional
level?
Requirement The lower the regional ownership concentration, the more
democratic equality is guaranteed and the higher the potential that
democracy is promoted.
Points 3 More than two competitors in all regions for all news media
types (newspapers, TV, radio, etc.)
0 Full news control of only one private media company in all
relevant regions (integrated media companies: newspaper, local TV,
radio, online)
Criteria  Plurality of ownership in the regions
 Transparency of ownership
 If there is a monopoly: Is it publicly controlled? Is it state-
owned?
 …
Date Sources Statistics (data, calculated market share ‘CR3’ of main regions in
the country)
(C2) The watchdog and the media’s mission statement
Question Does the mission statement of the company or the newsroom
contain provisions on playing an active watchdog role/on
investigative journalism or other forms of power monitoring?
Requirement If a mission statement concerning watchdog journalism exists, it is
more likely that democratic control is guaranteed and that
democracy is promoted.
Points 3 All relevant news media refer to watchdog role and exercise it
On media monitoring 195
Table 2. (continued)
0 No watchdog role is played
Criteria  Existence of a mission statement that refers to active
investigative journalism and duties to act as a trustee on behalf
of the public
 Level of importance of the watchdog role for the media
organization
 Examples of accountable watchdog role
 …
Data Sources Interviews
shows the closer definition of three example indicators and displays the
criteria the research team applied for each one. The empirical findings
from the project interlocutors in the five countries involved are docu-
mented for these three example indicators in the annex.
Findings
The first comparative pilot study applying the MDM to Germany, Lith-
uania, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland has been successfully
carried out. The final analysis reveals some interesting results, which are
common to all the countries covered:
 Although mass media are essential for contemporary democracies,
the level of internal democracy within news media organizations is
low. Even highly reputable mass media are not always organized in-
ternally as democratic institutions. There seems to be a gap between
the democratic role for the public and the media’s own internal de-
mocracy.
 Some of the most popular mass media have only low-profile institu-
tional protection of newsroom independence. The separation of news-
rooms from the management seems to erode significantly in media
entirely financed by advertising.
 Mass media that best serve democracy invest in quality journalism
and provide the necessary resources for investigative and responsible
reporting. Some of the most popular mass media appear to cut back
on these expenses. Journalism in some of these media organizations
is restricted to re-writing and editing of wire service reports with no
or little own investigation.
The following table provides an overview of the findings for each indica-
tor and each country. It also shows the democracy points given for each
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indicator by the research team based on the information provided by the
national correspondent. The complete version of the final research report
includes a comprehensive version of each country report and is made
available by the research team (Trappel and Maniglio, 2009).
According to these findings, the leading news media in the Nether-
lands are best equipped among the five countries reviewed to support
democracy. These media scored particularly high in the freedom and
equality dimensions. This reflects the high level of awareness about me-
dia matters in the Netherlands and the high level of observation to which
mass media there are subjected. Regarding the media’s watchdog func-
tion, the media studied prove to perform adequately, although news-
rooms and journalists were often given fewer resources to fulfilling their
watchdog function in recent years.
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In contrast, at the other end of the list, Lithuania scores lowest with
29 democracy points. A general trend is observed that the media, mainly
driven by consumerist approaches, have gradually abandoned the public
service mission of journalism. The Lithuanian media system has so far
developed only marginal internal mechanisms for quality control; the
influence of powerful institutions is comparably high and resources are
insufficient for the mass media to perform effectively as watchdogs.
Germany, Portugal, and Switzerland rank in between. Germany’s high
scores reflect the country’s available resources to sustain critical journal-
ism. Germany scored well in the control dimension, indicating that Ger-
many’s leading news media perform well as watchdogs. Switzerland has
relatively low scores in the freedom/information dimension. This is
partly due to the minimal influence journalists have in newsroom democ-
racy and partly due to the relatively low level of protection against in-
ternal and external influence on the newsrooms. Nonetheless, Swiss me-
dia perform well as watchdogs because the necessary resources are avail-
able and a strong public service organization keeps the level of profes-
sional standards high. Portugal, finally, has low scores in the equality/
interest mediation dimension. Mass media consumption is relatively ex-
pensive in Portugal and the level of self-regulation is low. As most media
are struggling with the economic recession, resources for watchdog and
investigative reporting are limited.
The following table helps to better compare these findings. On the one
hand, it shows the percentage of the highest possible score per dimension
and country; and, on the other, it adds up the three respective dimension
values and determines their total averages.
Table 4. Findings per dimension.
Percentage of the Maximum Score Nether- Germany Switzer- Portugal Lithua-
per Dimension and Country lands land nia
Freedom/Information 87 % 73 % 67 % 67 % 40 %
(max. 15)
Equality/Interest Mediation 87 % 80 % 70 % 67 % 60 %
(max. 30)
Control/Watchdog 67 % 67 % 67 % 42 % 42 %
(max. 12)
Total average 80 % 73 % 68 % 59 % 47 %
Conclusions
The mass communication field is rich in research concerning the impor-
tance of the mass media for democracy but knows surprisingly little
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about their democracy-related performance. Systematic observations
and monitoring are rare and the constant changes in the media environ-
ment do not make them easier to carry out. Although the number of
existing media monitoring institutions is large and growing, the instru-
ments used by them are generally too simple to measure media’s contri-
bution to the functioning of democracy. There is thus an inevitable need
for a monitoring instrument that measures media performance in a more
accurate way  as is allowed by the “Media for Democracy Monitor
(MDM).” However, the analytical instrument developed and presented
in this report is by no means final. It certainly must be refined and
deepened in order to do justice to the complex realities of democracy
and media (e. g., developing new indicators, finding solutions for the
statistical or theoretical allocations, etc.).
The main challenge of the research project was the choice of relevant
indicators. In a joint country workshop in November 2007, the indica-
tors were discussed in detail. The pilot study applying the MDM to the
five European countries (Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, and Switzerland) showed clearly that our indicators can be opera-
tionalized in different countries. The quantitative media market data as
well as the qualitative data collection were comparable in most cases.
In order to make the instrument workable, we decided to concentrate
on the meso level, while considering only a few aspects at the micro level
(e. g., the output of the media). We were therefore unable to focus atten-
tion on the macro level, which is the level of legal and administrative
rules and regulations. Accordingly, most of the selected 19 indicators
relate to media organizations, their newsrooms, and to journalistic con-
duct. One of the most interesting findings in this regard was indeed the
gap between the importance of the role of the mass media in democracies
and the low level of internal institutional provisions to safeguard internal
democracy as well as the dearth of arrangements to safeguard high qual-
ity standards for journalism in the leading mass media. The focus on
internal democracy was as such unproblematic, as we focused only on
mature democracies. In mature democracies it can be assumed that more
or less appropriate legal and administrative rules and regulation exist.
However, the limitation on the meso level might be too narrow to re-
spond to our crucial question concerning the requirements media must
meet in order to promote democracy. Without a doubt, our initial find-
ings contribute to the continuous debate on the role of the media for
democracy at an elevated level. Increased commercialization and the re-
fusal of some mass media to accept their democratic responsibility are
issues that are discussed frequently as media policy decisions are being
made (renewal of licenses, revisions of media law, role of the European
policy on national media, etc.). In any case, it seems to be necessary
On media monitoring 199
to optimize the instrument and invest more time in considering further
indicators, theories, and methods. This is all the more important as the
MDM Project has the potential to make a substantial contribution to
the body of evidence in the research field of political communication. It
is therefore planned to continue the project and regularly produce a
comparative annual or bi-annual media performance monitor.
It is important to continue efforts to analyze the media’s contribution
to democracy because only by specifying democracies’ normative impli-
cations for media as well as by identifying indicators by which the qual-
ity of news media might be evaluated, can we fully understand how
media affect democracy. It should thus never be taken for granted that
media promote democracy per se. As both democracies and media
change over time, their (inter-)relationship must be constantly redefined
and challenged.
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Notes
1. To these three models one should add what might be called ‘procedural democracy’
(Strömbäck, 2005). ‘Procedural democracy’ refers to Dahl’s ‘concept of polyarchy’
(1971). The core idea of such minimalist concepts is that they contain all the basic
requirements a polity must fulfill in order to be democratic. However, these con-
cepts are based on such an extremely minimalist view of democracy that we cannot
consider them as ‘realistic’ (Strömbäck, 2005: 334). We will therefore take this per-
spective into consideration but will not review it in detail.
2. This classification is taken from Bühlmann, Merkel and Wessels (2007).
3. This classification is taken from Bühlmann, Merkel and Wessels (2007).
4. The country experts are: Andre´ Donk, Frank Marcinkowski (Germany), Leen
d’Haenens (Netherlands), Aukse Balcˇytiene˙, Egle Napryte (Lithuania), Joaquim
Fidalgo (Portugal), Tanja Maniglio, Josef Trappel (Switzerland).
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